Monday11 November 2024
g-novosti.in.ua

Nuclear weapons development, changes in mobilization, and negotiations with Russia: an extensive interview with Maxim Zhorin.

The deputy commander of one of the most renowned brigades in the army, the 3rd Special Operations Brigade, Major Maxim Zhorin, is recognized for his involvement in the battles in eastern Ukraine. The fighter shared with Focus how the conflict in Ukraine has transformed his perception of war and what is necessary to achieve victory over the enemy.
Максим Жорин о ядерном оружии, мобилизации и переговорах с Россией: эксклюзивное интервью.

Deputy Commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade, Major of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Maksym Zhorin, with the call sign "Mose" began his military career in 2014 when he volunteered to join "Azov." Over three years, he progressed from a private soldier to a regiment commander.

Since 2017, Zhorin has been involved in political activities; however, with the onset of the full-scale invasion, he joined the formation of the Kyiv volunteer unit of the Territorial Defense "Azov — Kyiv," which was later expanded into a Separate Special Purpose Regiment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He served as co-commander, and since 2023, he has become Deputy Commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade.

Жорин из Азова, Максим Жорин, интервью с Максимом Жориным9

“Zelensky's Victory Plan”: Are Negotiations with the Russian Federation Possible?

How do you assess the feasibility of implementing the military component of the "Victory Plan"? Do you see any issues with the supply of weapons and ammunition, particularly long-range missiles?

This issue certainly exists. In general, regarding the "Victory Plan," my personal opinion is that we cannot afford to create another illusion for ourselves that simply having a plan will solve anything without any effort. That won't be the case, no matter how detailed or good the plan is. But we must understand that this war will ultimately need to be concluded exclusively by Ukrainians using their own forces.

As for armaments, equipment, and everything else — there are indeed problems with their supply. Certainly, there is a shortage, and we must work on getting the West to assist us more intensively, explaining that it is in their interests as well. However, we must also frankly acknowledge that the West will not always be there to help us, and their supplies are running low, and ammunition production is limited. We need to focus not only on requests to the West but also on building our own powerful defense industry, where we can produce our equipment, our ammunition, our drones, and in that case, we can plan based on our own capabilities.

Заместитель командира 3-й ОШБр Максим Жорин в интервью Фокусу0

How do you see possible negotiations with Russia after the implementation of the "Victory Plan"? Or do you not see them at all?

I don’t see them. Honestly, I do not see how, about what, or how any negotiations with Russia could be possible at this moment. Again, there seems to be an impression that Russia would have any desire to negotiate with us right now, but I don't see any conditions for that. Why would the Russians stop and sit down at the negotiating table with us today if it isn’t going to be a conversation about Ukraine's complete surrender?

Like it or not, the reality is that the situation on the front is not very good for us. The Russians are managing to implement their plans, albeit at a high cost. Therefore, at this stage, considering the complexity of the situation in the east, I do not see any conditions for negotiations at the table. We can, of course, hope for anything, but the Russians only stop where they are stopped. And as long as they can advance, they will continue to push deeper into our territory.

Заместитель командира 3-й ОШБр Максим Жорин в интервью Фокусу1

Any war ultimately ends with negotiations. What do we need to do on the front to approach them from a stronger position?

First of all, we need to learn from our mistakes. This is very important. The Ukrainian army has undergone a dynamic development path over a relatively short period. Today, it is one of the strongest and most experienced armies in the world. No other army in the world currently possesses the experience that the Ukrainian army has, including the Russian army. All modern combat methods and technologies are being tested and implemented right here on our battlefield with Ukrainian fighters, sergeants, and officers. So that is a positive aspect.

The second part is that, alongside this experience and all these tools, we sometimes forget that we are different from the Russians and must fight differently. We have a number of mistakes at the strategic and sometimes tactical levels in applying our own forces. This can happen, and it does happen. But it is crucial that this does not repeat. It is very important that the command is held accountable for the decisions they make, as this is critical for the internal state of the army and for further actions.

Заместитель командира 3-й ОШБр Максим Жорин в интервью Фокусу2

Today, we have a certain problem with this, primarily related to the fact that there still remains a significant number of generals who have never seen the front in their lives. They have heard explosions at best from many kilometers away. And this person sometimes simply does not understand some basic things that happen on the battlefield.

If we talk about what we need to do on the front, we need to get our army in order because it is already difficult for us. We need to approach the mobilization of society properly, stabilize the front line, and acquire the tools for victory. They must be present both on the battlefield and in the diplomatic-economic sphere.

If we are talking about a full-fledged nuclear complex, it will certainly take many years. But if we are discussing tactical nuclear weapons, it is absolutely feasible to achieve that today.

Ukraine's NATO Membership or the Appearance of Nuclear Weapons?

Is a truce possible on the condition of exchanging territories for Ukraine's NATO membership?

I don't think that is realistic. Again, who will decide which territories we will exchange? If you look at the DeepState map, the territory that is occupied today and what it will be tomorrow can be completely different.

First of all, it is a rather complicated question of how this can be done. But there is also a complete understanding that as soon as we give up some part of our territory, even in exchange for some temporary truce, the appetites of our enemy will still be aimed at our entire territory. I do not believe that by giving up some part, the Russians will stop.

Заместитель командира 3-й ОШБр Максим Жорин в интервью Фокусу3

Secondly, I do not see a strong desire from NATO to take us, whether with territories or without them. Unfortunately, the West is currently quite passive in its position. It even shows a certain cowardice in terms of constantly trembling before how Russia will react to this, how someone else will react.

Meanwhile, our adversary has already formed a full-fledged world corporation of evil, which includes countries like Russia, China, or Korea. They are much more decisive in their actions and in supporting each other. Unfortunately, that is not what we see in the West today. I do not yet see a desire from NATO; we may have it. But does NATO have that desire today? If this is discussed, can it realistically happen in the near future? So far, everything indicates that we will have to deal with the problems we have ourselves.

Zelensky stated that Ukraine should either be accepted into NATO or have its nuclear weapons returned. In your opinion, which would be more effective?

Nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have always been, are, and will be the most effective tool for one's own security. No other guarantees will ever replace the presence of one's own forces. We have already seen how it went when we gave up our nuclear weapons; we were promised security, and where is it? Not one of the signatory countries that guaranteed us security… One of those countries even attacked us, while others pretend this is not a real attack, but rather a conflict, "SVO," and so on. We have no security guarantees. How will the next guarantees differ from those given to us? However, having our own nuclear weapons would provide us with certain tools that would guarantee our security.

Even before the start of the full-scale war, I was in favor of restoring our nuclear status; it is possible. It’s not easy, but this potential can be realized in Ukraine. We are not a country that threatens the world or anything like that. We are a country that faced the situation of having its nuclear weapons taken away, and the guarantees did not work. I believe that at this stage, we have the right to reclaim it ourselves. Of course, this needs to be discussed with other world leaders. But even the existence of at least tactical nuclear weapons, in my opinion, would be a significant tool in any negotiations and in the issue of national security.

Заместитель командира 3-й ОШБр Максим Жорин в интервью Фокусу4

Could this become a reality in the near future?

If we are talking about a full-fledged nuclear complex, then, of course, it will take many years. But if we are discussing tactical nuclear weapons, it is absolutely feasible to achieve that today. Moreover, we already have part of this. The most important thing is that we have preserved intellectual capabilities and potential. We have partial infrastructure that has also been preserved, and it needs to be restored. Of course, modern nuclear weapons and modern nuclear research differ from what we had stopped at. But all this can be restored and rebuilt, and it will become a truly strong foundation for us.

Do you think our partners might agree to return nuclear weapons to us?

I think they do not want to. This is obvious because they also understand that with the emergence of nuclear weapons, we become another strong country on the world map. Our partners are unlikely to